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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
LA VAR PETERSON,
Plaintiff and Petitioner,

v.
?•lARRINER l\1. lVIORRISON,
District Judge,
Defendant, and Respondent.

II

Plaintiff's
Brief

STATEMENT OF FACTS
An Alternative Writ of Mandate was issued out
of this court to l\1arriner M. Morrison, District Judge,
August 10, 1948, directing him to "enter judgment in
conformity with the judgment of the Supreme Court
in the above entitled cause, in case No. 7056, as
directed by this court, or that you appear and show
cause before this court on the 20th day of August~
1948."
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Prior to the issuance of the writ, and after the
opinion and mandate to enter judgment as directed
in said case· had been remitted to the court below,
the plaintiffs in said case, with the leave of Judge
Morrison, filed a paper entitled "Amendment", a copy
of which is mar-'ked "Exhibit A" and is attached to
the affidavit and Petition herein, and' is hereby
referred to. The plaintiffs also applied for ard the
court issued, a Restraining Order and Order to Show
Cause, directed to La Var Peterson and the Curlew
Irrigation and Reservoir Company, a corporation,
and its Secretary, enjoining and restraining La Var
from selling, pledging, transferring or in any manner
disposing of the 119 shares of stock, which the
''Amendment" alleged was "appurtenant" to the
S\V~4 of the NWYt of Section 2, T 14 N, R 8 W,
S. L. M., and the Irrigation Company was also enjoined and restrained from transferring the said stock.
upon its books, until after "final determination of the
new issues raised by the amended pleadings.
La Var and the other defendants in said cause
then filed "Demurrer to Purported Amendment and
M·otion to Dismiss Restraining Order and Order to
Show Cause" and "Morton to Strike Purpoitcd
Amendment" and also "Motion that Judgment be
Entered as Ordered by the Supreme Court."
These motions were all set· for hearing on the
law and' motion calendar and were duly argued to
the court on .July 18th. At the conclusion of the
argument, Judge Morrison said he would take said
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matter under advisement. He further stated that
if he granted our Motion that Judgment be Entered
as Directed by the Supreme Court that would end
and terminate all these matters.
On July 28th I received through the l\Ia.il copy
of the following order:
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF UTAH,
BOX ELDER COUNTY
GOLDEN PETERSON, et, al.
Plaintiffs,

ORDER

vs.
JOHN CHARLES PETERSON, et. al.
Defendants.

Justice and equity demanding, it is
ORDERED that defendant's demurrer and
Motion to dismiss filed in the above entitled cause be and the same is hereby overruled and denied, and defendant is given 10
days notice to answer or otherwise plead.
l\1ARRINER M. MORRISON,
DISTRICT JUDGE.
July 27, 1948.
Upon receipt of that order I went over and talked
to Judge 1\forrison in his chambers at Log-an, and
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asked him what he bad decided to do about our
Motion that Judgment be Entered as Directed l.>y the
Supreme Court. He said he thought he would keep
the motion pending until after the hearing and final
determination of the case on the amended pleadings.
I told the Judge that I didn't think he could do
that, that I didn't think he had jur~sdiction to have
any further hearing on said matter, or authority to
try any new issues, and I insisted that he either
grant or deny our Motion that Judgment be Entered
as Directed by the Supreme Court. Judge Morrison
then said, ''If I deny your motion, you will cite me~
down to the Suprem2 Court on mandamus proceedings." I said, "I certainly will, Judge. I don't think
you have any other p~werl or authority, except to
comply with the mandate of the Supr~me Court and
enter up judgment as the Suprem~ Court has didirected." The Judge said he would think the matter
over further and decide what to do about our
motion.
A few days thereafter I received in the mail
copy of Order denying our motion that Judgment be
entered as ordered by the Supreme Court, a copy of
which Order is set forth in the Affidavit and Petition
herein, marked ''Exhibit E", which is hereby referred
to and made a part of tl-tis statement of facts.
After the time had expired as stated in
Alternative Writ, upon inquiry, I was advised
the Clerk, Mr. Cummings, of the Answer filed
Judge Morrison hPrein. I then took a copy of

the
by

by
the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Affidavit and Petition to Judge Morrison. He said
he would mail it to the Attorney General who was
his attorney in this matter. After that I received
a letter from the Attorney General's Office enc1osing copy of RespondE'nt's Answer, and stating that
they had forwarded all pap::rs to Attorrev J. D.
Skeen. who would handle the matter on behalf of
Judge 1\Iorrison.
In his Answer to the Alternative \Yr:t of Mandate respondent says that "he believes he is justified
in whatever action is complained of and that he has
a good and legal defense to said writ." He further
states that he is not informed of the complaint
because no copy of the affidavit was served upon
him. r\ s noted abJve he has now rE'ceived copy of.
the Affidavit and Petition, which he has sent to his
attorneys.
In the original complaint, filed about six years
ago, the plaintiffs asked that Charles PetetSOJli and
the other defendants hold four separate tracts of land
in trust for plaintiffs. In the first amended complaint
they asked that 1\'Iaria Pet€rson be adjudged to hold
above described premises in trust for plaintiffs. In
their second am,ended complaint they asked that the
deed from Maria Peterson to LaVar be adjudged to be
null and void, alleging that LaVar was not a bona
fide purchaser for value.
Although the trial court found and held that
LaVar was a bona fide purcl1aser. for valu~. this court
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in case No. 7056, (being a case in equity) made its
own findings, and held that La Var was not a bona
fide purchaser for value, without notice, and therefore
found that the prayer of the second amenced complaint should be granted, and judgment should be
entered that the deed from Maria Peterson to LaVar
should be held to be null and void, and Maria should
be adjudged to hold the above described premises in
trust for p~aintiffs, nad rerranded the case to tl1e
court below with direction to enter up said judgment.
In none of the above plead1ngs was any water
stock ever mentioned or claimed. In the first com~
plaint this 40 acres was only incidental. The main
land they apparently started for was the SE%. of Sec.
12. Now t<hey want to go back and include water stock
in an irrigation company as appurtenant to the 40
acres. If that stock is aprurbnant to that land, why
did plaintiffs get out an injunctive writ against LaVar
and the Irrigation Company?
ARGUMENT
The one principal question presented to this
Court therefore is: \Vas the Respondent as District
Judge, justified in ignoring the mandate of the
Supreme Court in case No. 7056 in which this court
ordered: "The Judgment is reversed with directions
to the trial court to enter judgment in conformity
with this opinion."
We submit there is no m3rit in Respondent's
prayer that the Alternative \Vrit be recalled. Re·
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spondent knew and was well versed in all of the facts.
The 1\Iotion to Enter Up Judgment as Ordered by the
Supreme Court was argued before Judge Morrison
on two different occasions. The statute does not
require any notice to the adverse party before the
alternative writ is issued. Section 104-68-5, U.C.A.
1943.
\Ve think the law is well settled that Respondent
in case at bar had no jurisdiction or authority to
do any other act than that which the court ordered.
5 C.J.S. pg 1514, No. 1967,-Generallyi the
lower court has no power, after a cause has been
determined on appeal, to vacate or modify the
judgment of the app2llate court, or its own judgment after affirmance.
5 C.J.S. pg 1521, Amendments, After Final
Judgment Rendered or Directed.
Ordinarily the trial court has no power to
allow 't~1e amendment of plead~ngs after final
judgment has been rendered or directed on
appeal.
30 ALR 1414, general rule that, when merits
of a case are determined on appeal, trial court has
no power but to obey judgment of the appellate
court.
Bancroft's Code Practice and Remedies, Vol.
9. page 9769, No. 7429, Proceedings in Lower
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Court Generally - Construction of Mandate. lt
is the duty of the lower court, when a case is
remanded, to comply with the mandate of the
avvt!llate court, even though there is error therein. Public interests require that an end shall be
put to litigation and if a lower court were authorized to disobey the mandate, litigation would
never be ended, and the supreme tribunal of the
state would be shorn of that authority over
inferior tribunals with which it is invested
by fundamental law. A trial .court has no jurisdiction except to proceed in accordance with
the mandate or remittitur, and any pr,oceedings
contrary thereto must be treated as null and
void. So where a mandate directs the entry
of a particular judgment, it is the duty of the
trial court to proceed as directed.
Same source, No. 7430:
Additional Pleadings.

Am2ndments

and

* * * According to the weight of authority, a trial court may not permit the filing of
amended or supplemental pleadings or allow
new issues to be framed to try rights already
settled, where a cause is reversed and remanded
with directions to enter. a particular judgment~

* * *

Galbreath v. Vi/' all rich, 139 Am. St. Rep. 263,
(Colo.) : Amendment of the pleadings disallowed after the Supreme Court had reversed the
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lower court and ordered judgment in favor of ·
plaintiffs.
Fork, etc., v. Tool Co., 160 U. S. 2-17, quoting with approval \Yadhams v. Gay, 83 Ill. 250:
On receipt of the mandate and opinion the trial
court was bound to carry into C:)mplete effect
the decision of this court, not to retry the cause
or place the parties in a position by which the
cause might be retried. In what a lamentable
condition would suitors be if the opinions and
final orders of this court are to be disregarded
by an inferior court. One of the great interests
of the public is that an end shall b€ put to
litigation. The opinion of this court was on
merits. The mandate required the trial court
to enter judgment in conformity with the
opinion of this court, - not a retrial of the
case, or the entry of any order which might
have that effect. The authorities are clear on
this point. Skillers Ex'rs v. Mays Ex'rs, 3 L.
Ed. 220, decided by the Supnme Court of the
U S.. as early as 1810, is directly on this question and subsequnet cases harmonize with it.
Gloser v. Wonnelley, 193 P. 76 (N.l\i.). It
is well settled that it is the duty of the lower
court on remand of a cause to comply with the
mandate of the appellate court and to obey the
directions therein without variation, even though
the mandate may be, or· is. supposed to be
erroneous. 4 C..J. pg. 1221.
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Lumber Co. v. Swartwont, 197 P. 1027,
(Idaho), Where tL.e appellate court remands the
cause with direction to enter judgment for one
of the parties, the judgm~nt of the appellate
court is the final judgment in the cause, and the
·entry thereof in the lower court is a purely
ministerial act. 2 RCL 389, (citing many cases)
and 3 L.R.A. (N.S.) 715.
3 Am. J ur. page 729 : H. Proceedings in
trial court after remand. No. 1233. Generally.
As pointed out above, the jurisdiction( of the
court below, which was lost by the court suing
out of write of error or by th.e appeal, is reacquired when the mandate is filed with it.
Further proceedings in the trial court necessary
to carry out the mandate are then had. These
however, must be in accord with the mandate,
and the trial court must therefore asc2rtain
the meaning of the mandate and determine what
was decided by the reviewing court in order that
it may know what disposition to make of the
case. When the mandate orders a specific judg-ment to be entered, no difficulty· or question of
construction arises, for there is nothing; for the
court to do but to enter the judrm~nt directed ..
No. 1234 .Duty to Comply with Mandate.
After a case has been determined by the reviewing court and remanded to the trial court,
the duty of the latter is to comply with the
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mandate of the former. The mandat('J of the
reviewing court is binding on the lower court
and must be strictly followed and carried into
effect according to its true intent and meaning,
as determined by the directions given by sucn
reviewing court. Public interest requires that
litigation shall come to an end spzedily, so that
when a cause has been tried to judgment, and
the merits of a trial determined upon appeal,
the trial court upon remittitur, has no power
but to obey the judgment of the appe:Iate
court. , It may, by various methods, be compelled to comply with that mandate; and if it
misconstrues the direction of the reviewing court,
does not give full effect to its mandate, or ent-:-.rs
a judgment ·or decree which is not in conformity thereto, a new review is appropriate. Proceedings contrary . to the mandate must be
treated · as null and void.
No. 1236. Judgment in Conformity to Mandate. The lower court, upon remand of a case
from a higher court, must obey the mandate or
remittitur; and render judgment in conformity
thereto; . it has no authority to enter any judgment not in conformity with the order, or any
judgment other than directed or permitted by
the
reviewing court.
Otherwise,
litigation
would never be ended, and the supreme tribunal
of the state would be shorn of authority over
inferior tribunals.
This is particularly true
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when the mandate or remittitur orders the entry
·Of a specific judgment or a particular decree.
When the merits of a case are determined on
appeal, the trial court has no power but to obey
the judgment of the appellate court . . . Where
the appellate court remands a cause with directions to enter judgment for the plaintiff in
a certain amount, the judgment of the appellate
court is a final judgment in the cause and the
entry thereof in the lower court is a purely
ministerial act. No modification of the j udgment so directed can be made, nor may any
provision be engrafted on, or taken from, it.
That order is conclusive on the parties, and no
judgment or ·order different from, or in addition to, that directed bv it can have any effect,
even though it may be such as the appellate
court ought to have directed.
No. 1237. Alteration, 1\tlodification, Amendment, etc., by Trial Court of Mandate. After
the reviewing court has determined a case before it and remanded such case to the lower
court, the latter is without power to modify,
alter, amend, set aside, or in any manner distur or depart from the judgment of the
reviewing court, even during the continuance
of the term in which it was rendered. The
judgment of the higher court is not reviewable
in any way by the court below, in the exercise
of its equitable powers, or otherwise. The
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lower CJurt cannot vary or examine the d~cree
of the higher court for any other purpose than
execution; give any other or further relief;
review it, even for apparent error, upon any
matter decided on appeal; or intermeddle with
it, further than to settle so much as has been
remanded. It can only proceed to execute the
mandate and settle so much as re·mains to be
done, without rescission or modification.
If the lower courts were autlJ.or:zed to disob2y the mandate, litigation would never be
ended and the supreme tribunal of the state
would be shorn of that authority over the inferior tribunal with which it is invested. But
the rule has long prevailed that there must be
an end to the litigation of a particular cause,
and that an alleged injured litigant, in order to
establish what he may deem the justice of the
cause, may not have, de novo, trial afV.:1r trial,
ad infinitum. The principle that a lower court
has no power to ::liter or amend a judgment
after it has be~n· affrmed by a reviewing- court
and remanded to the lowPr court is applicable
to criminal, as well as to civil, cases .
No. 1232.
3 Am. Jur. page 72'8.:
Compelling Obedience to Mandate. When the trial court
fails or refuses to obey or give effect to the
mandate or remittitur of the reviewing court,
misconstrues it, or acts beyond its province in
carrying it out, it becomes the province and
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duty of the appellate court to enforce compliance
therewith. The remedy generally recognized as
the proper one is a writ or order of m~ndamus,
but this is not the only remedy; a new app:;al
may be had, and on such second appeal the
court may, instead of remanding the case again,
itself proceed to final judgment. In some jurisdictions, compliance with the mandate may
also be enforced by contempt proceedings and
by a writ of prohibition. Such remedies may
be defeated by delay in making application to
c.ompel obedience to the mandate.
In conclusion we respectfully submit tnat any
claim or allegation about the water stock, or . that
said stock. is "appurtenant" to the described pre~ises
raises new issues of fact not heretofore raised or
claimed, which are now precluded as resjudicata. To
settle those issues would require a ne·w trial. Tne
plaintiff's fixed the bounds and purpose of their action
in their pleading. Neither in their original complaint,
nor in their first supplerr:ental eomplaint, nor in their
second supplemental complaint did they mention or
make any claim to any water stock, but claimed only
the land.
Respectfully submitted,
LEON FONNESBECK,
Attorney for Petitioner.
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